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ABSTRACT
It is proposed that people perceive differentiy the status of persons 
or positions in any collectivity as a function of their own status positions. 
Specifically, the lower the actual or imagined or aspired to status of the 
perceiver the smaller will be the dispersion of his status judgments, 
primarily because he diminishes the status distance between persons or 
positions by raising the status of those at the lower end of the continuum. 
This was demonstrated with data on occupational prestige perceptions from a 
national sample and a group of high school senior males and with data on 
popularity judgments by members of a school class. The importance of these 
perspectivai differences for theoretical conceptions of status-related 
behavior is emphasized, and the possibility of affecting aspirations by 
changing status cognitions is discussed.
STATUS PERCEPTIONS*
Ever since I-Iarx, ideological theorists have insisted that one's position 
in the social structure profoundly influences his perspective on the system.
The literature in sociology is full of studies showing that social class makes 
important differences in attitudes, values, and life-styles. But there is one 
area in which consensual perceptions across social strata constitute the 
overwhelming emphasis. Strangely enough, this research deals with the very 
perception of status itself— occupational prestige judgments. Davies (1952) 
searched futilely among prestige perception studies for differences in status 
perceptions by the social position of the perceiver, but he had to conclude 
that more than a quarter-century of research revealed only a "remarkable 
consensus".
The impression of remarkable consensus has been reinforced by the results 
reported in the two decades since Davies1 review of the literature. Study 
after study stresses correlations of +.98 and better between the status 
judgments of different strata within and between most industrialized societies. 
But this impression— that social position does not influence status percep­
tions— is inconsistent with most societal theories. Furthermore, it conflicts 
with a vast amount of evidence in psychophysics and social psychology (Sherif 
and Hovland, 1961; Helson, 1964) showing that a person's position (or anchor 
standard) on any judgmental scale influences his perception of stimuli along 
that dimension. And, finally, the illusion of remarkable consensus simply 
does not fit the data from many of the studies that foster it.
The problem of differential status perceptions is an important one, and it 
needs to be reclaimed as an area deserving sociological scrutiny. Aside from 
the theoretical relevance of the phenomena per se. there are many research
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questions that presume knowledge of and require measurement of status 
perceptions. For instance: Status incongruity assumes perceived
distinctions and discrepancies in several status-orders that affect a person's 
self-regard and others' treatments of him. Problems of distributive justice 
necessarily involve placement of self and socially compared others in status 
positions. And, of course, any concern with levels of aspiration and achieve­
ment orientation fundamentally implicate perceived status distinctions.
Since status is a critical variable that governs the rights and rules in 
terms of which interactors mutually orient themselves, differential assess­
ments can make important differences in the flow of social interaction. The 
primary purpose of this paper is to establish that systematic perceptual 
differences d£ exist in status structures as a function of the perceiver's 
position; to suggest that these are general properties of all types of status 
systems; and to illustrate that these differential perceptions are associated 
with important phenomena of interest to social scientists. After reviewing 
the literature on status perceptions, new research evidence will be presented 
and its implications discussed.
Community and Occupational Prestige Studies
The pioneering and now-classic series of studies by W. Lloyd Warner (1949) 
remains the most comprehensive body of research in the area of community 
prestige. Unfortunately, Warner was so concerned to find the "true" number 
of classes and correctly place individuals in them that he tended to ignore 
annoying indications of differential perceptions. He was later criticized for 
this and, particularly, for selecting upper-middle class judges as informants 
(Komhauser, 1953). But subsequent work was never really systematic enough 
or of sufficient scope to provide conclusive answers to the problems raised.
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From the Warner series, however, tnere did emerge a particularly cognent 
statement of class-related differences in status perceptions. Davis, Gardner, 
and Gardner (1941) discussed variations by structural position in perceptions 
of the bases as well as the judgmental variations associated with status 
distinctions. They noted two tendencies: (1) Prestige distinctions decrease 
in fineness with increasing "social distance" between judge and adjudged; and 
(2) people tend to enhance their relative prestige in a system by utilizing 
many or few judgmental categories. The number of class groupings perceived 
increases with the status of the judge. "In general, too, individuals visualize 
class groups above them less clearly than those below them; they tend to 
minimize the social differentiation between themselves and those above...In 
view of this situation it is not surprising that individuals in the two upper 
strata make the finest gradations in the stratification of the whole society 
and that class distinctions are made with decreasing precision as social 
position becomes lower." (Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, 1941, p. 72).
Lewis (1964) noted that the "social distance" and "ego-enhancement" generali­
zations are somewhat inconsistent in their implications, and he suggested an 
appropriate reformulation. People should be able to make the finest distinc­
tions in those adjacent areas of the social structure that are most familiar 
and relevant to them, but doing so above one’s ovm position tends to lower 
self-evaluation. Thus, it seems most likely that prestige distinctions will 
be made as social distance decreases and as the ego-enhancement implied by the 
distinction increases. The proposition has never been adequately tested, but 
it seems consistent with observations from community prestige data.
One would expect to find such propositions systematically explored with the 
data from occupational prestige studies, especially since these studies have
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employed more adequate sampling and more sophisticated methodological technique 
However, investigators in this area have been more impressed by the correla­
tional consensus among respondents than interested in exploring differential 
perceptions of prestige. In an extensive analysis of the 1950 NORC data,
Reiss briefly comments: ״The most obvious difference in the ratings of 
occupations by economic level, both in terms of rank and prestige-increment 
criteria, is the tendency for poor people to rate almost all occupations... 
higher than do the prosperous, with the middle class generally intermediate in 
position" (Reiss, 1961, p. 175). However, he wonders if this difference 
might not be due to response-category labels (the poor regard any steady job 
as "good") and makes little of it. However, something should be made of it, 
because it produces a pattern of status judgments that is similar to that in 
community prestige studies, where respondents chose their own categories for 
judgment.
In this paper I will argue that there is a consistent patterning of differ­
ential prestige perceptions by the position of the perceiver and that it is 
the same in any structure. A status structure is defined as a consensual 
ordering of persons or positions along a similarly-valued dimension by knowl­
edgeable members of a collectivity. Thus, for there to be a status structure, 
rank-order consensus must exist about the relative placements of persons or 
positions along an evaluative dimension that is similarly valued (that is, 
placement implies evaluation and one end of the continuum— e.g., "high" 
status— is more positively valued than the other). Ilembers of the collectivity 
are considered competent judges if they know (1) the meaning of the dimension 
in terms of which they must judge and (2) are familiar enough with the objects
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of judgment to know how to place them. The definition is appropriately general 
enough to include any collectivity (from a small group to a national society) 
in which individuals, positions, or status-attributes are similarly ranked in 
terms of a consensually valued dimension.
First, I want to provide support for the basic proposition that the 
dispersion of status judgments increases as the status of the judge increases 
in different types of structures with different types of populations. I also 
want to show that this proposition is true, not only for actual status of the 
judge, but also with regard to his anticipated, imagined, or aspired to status 
in the system. The implications of this lawful relation between perceiver's 
position and the patterning of his prestige perceptions will then be discussed 
briefly. We will consider occupational prestige judgements of a national 
sample, popularity judgments among students in a high school, and the prestige 
perceptions and educational aspirations of high school senior males.
I. Occupational Prestige: The NORC Data
The original NORC data from 1950 are presented by Reiss (1961, pp. 198-217; 
276-295) in such a way that it is possible to reconstruct the data in appro­
priate form. However, we run into a problem over our "knowledgeable respondent" 
criteria of judgment, because there are substantial numbers of "don't know" 
responses in the study. The evidence indicates that knowledge about occupations 
is differentially distributed within the status structure such that it 
decreases as (1) the status of the position being rated increases and (2) the 
status of the rater decreases. Furthermore, the NORC study contained a dispro­
portionate number of high status occupations that are fairly technical, if not 
quite esoteric. Data from the study show two things: First the absence of
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accurate knowledge about an occupation does not dissuade people from rating 
it (Reiss, 1961, p. 17). Although only 49.6 per cent of respondents rated the 
occupation of nuclear physicist, a later question revealed that 61.3 per cent 
of those rating it did not know what it was (they had "no idea", "vague" or 
"wrong" responses about what a nuclear physicist did). Second, knowledge 
affects ratings. Those who were correct in knowing what a nuclear physicist 
did (N78־־) rated the position as an "excellent" one in 71.8 per cent of the 
cases, whereas only 31.3 per cent of those who had no idea what he did (N=400) 
gave excellent ratings.
Table I About Here
Although we cannot determine which respondents were relatively ignorant 
from the summary data presented by P^ eiss, we can eliminate occupations that 
were relatively unknown. Arbitrarily, 27 of the 90 occupations were removed, 
because less than 95 per cent of the respondents claimed to know enough about 
them to rate them. The per cent of respondents at each status level who rated 
these occupations as "excellent" or "good" is presented in Table 1, with the 
occupations being divided into equal thirds according to their overall prestige 
scores. The data show substantial differences by rater-status in the prestige 
scores assigned the lower two-thirds of the hierarchy, but very little 
differences in ratings of the top third. It is obvious from the table that 
the dispersion of judgmental responses decreases as the status of the judge 
decreases: lower status respondents are less inclined to use the "poor" 
category and more frequently use the positive ratings. It is possible, however,
that the category labels did have something to do with these results; and it 
is also possible that these data are peculiar to occupational prestige ratings 
or to large social collectivities. Thus, to explore the generality of the 
phenomena, we turn to consideration of a very different type of "prestige": 
popularity among one's high school classmates.
II. High School Popularity Ratings
To get a better picture of differential status perceptions as a function 
of the perceiver's position and to establish the generality of the phenomena 
across a range of status structures, it seemed advantageous to move away from 
the areas of occupational or community prestige. To minimize methodological 
problems "popularity"-status judgments in a high school class were selected 
for investigation. This eliminated entirely the difficulties of sampling—  
especially acute in selecting occupations to be judged— by permitting inclusion 
of the entire universe of judges and judgmental objects. Knowledge could be 
determined rather directly. Furthermore, an informal collectivity has no 
historically established barriers to communication and information nor any 
specialization of task-functions, associational patterns, and structurally 
determined visibility channels. Finally, a high school class is sufficiently 
different from community or national occupational prestige structures that 
claims of generality are more plausible.
A school in a middle-income suburb was selected on the basis of homogeneity 
in socio-economic composition, moderate class size, and limited geographical 
dispersion of students. The 161 students whom the school classified as seniors 
were asked to judge the popularity of the same-sex others in their class. 
Popularity was judged on a 9-point, unlabelled continuum, ranging from LOW to
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HIGH. Listings were mimeographed in alphabetical order, with the pages 
randomly ordered for presentation. The poles of the judgmental continuum were 
not alternated, since constant response bias was unimportant compared to a 
risk of increased response error.
To insure that respondents were knowledgeable and the judgmental universe 
"known", judgments by and about students were removed if they did not judge 
or were not judged by 80 per cent of their classmates. A person was judged 
unless the respondent "never heard of him" or knew "nothing about him at all". 
Fourteen students were eliminated, seven of whom had been in the school less 
than two years. The popularity ranking for each sex was determined on the 
basis of responses by the 147 seniors remaining. They were divided into 
approximately equal thirds (25-24-25 for males, 24-25-24 for females). All 
data were initially analyzed separately by sex (Alexander, 1965, pp. 161-187); 
but they are averaged here, since it simplifies presentation and does not 
change the conclusions.
Since consensual rank-ordering is required in order that a status structur! 
exist, we computed correlation coefficients between each individual's 
popularity judgments and the consensually defined mean values on popularity 
for each of the persons rated. Even though rank-order agreement is all that 
is required, it was more convenient and interesting to compute the Pearsonian 
coefficients. By equal-thirds of the popularity order for judges, the average 
coefficients were between +.70 and +.79, with a very slight tendency for 
higher status respondents to be more "accurate". It might be more theoreti­
cally appropriate to discard cases who did not perceive the popularity order­
ing in accord with their peers; but this was not done, since everyone had an
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accuracy correlation above +.30 and any cut-off point would have been arbitrary. 
Obtaining average Pearsonian correlations above .70 indicates adequate 
consensus, especially since these are undoubtedly lower than rank-order 
coefficients would be.
Table 2 About ilere
Table 2 presents the mean popularity judgments of those in each popularity 
third about those at each third, and the data show the expected pattern. As 
with occupational judgments, respondents do not differ much in their ratings 
of those at the upper end of the prestige-popularity continuum, but they 
progressively differ as the status of the judgmental object decreases. The 
dispersion of popularity judgments decreases as the popularity of the judge 
decreases. Once again, this is due to the fact that lower status judges give 
higher ratings to objects of judgment as the positions of those objects 
decrease in status.
Since we asked our respondents to rate themselves on the popularity 
dimensions along with their ratings of classmates, we can examine the prediction 
that judgmental dispersions are associated with anticipated, imagined, or 
aspired to status positions. The standard deviation of popularity judgments 
was computed for each respondent; and, by sex at each of the three status levels 
they were divided at the median. Mean self-placements were׳then computed.
Table 3 presents the mean self-placement judgments of respondents by actual 
popularity ranking and high or low standard deviation of popularity judgments. 
The table shows that objective and self-perceived popularity standings are
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associated with judgmental dispersions in the same way: dispersions increase 
with actual and imagined popularity ratings. This has interesting implications, 
which we xiill consider after presenting some data gathered on high school 
senior males' prestige perceptions and educational aspirations.
Table 3 About Here
III. Male Seniors' Occupational Perceptions and Educational Aspirations
In an upper status suburban area we surveyed high school senior males 
about their college plans and perceptions of occupational prestige. They 
rated the prestige of 50 occupations (using the 1I0RC list as a core and trying 
to balance the distribution of occupational statuses to approximate that in 
the population) on an unlabelled, 9־point continuum. Based on their responses 
to a question about father's occupation we classified them as either white 
collar or blue collar. We eliminated those who did not give adequate responses 
to the prestige-judgment question (failed to discriminate among occupations, 
didn't answer, or answered in obviously idiosyncratic ways) and those who, in 
a separate question about knowledge of 15 jobs, indicated they knew little 
or nothing about most.
Table 4 About Here
־ 11 ־
Table 4 reports the mean occupational prestige judgments by status of 
judge and judged and the percentage of respondents at each status level whose 
standard deviation of prestige judgments was above the sample mean. The mean 
judgments show the expected pattern, and the standard deviations of white 
collar students are significantly higher than those of blue collar respondents. 
Turning now to their aspirations following graduation from high school, we 
found that almost all had some plans for further education, so we classified 
them as "high aspirers" if they planned to attend a 4־year college or 
University and "low aspirers" if they planned anything else.
Table 5 About Here
Table 5 presents the per cent who have high aspirations— by status level 
and the standard deviation of their occupational prestige judgments. Just as 
with the popularity judgments shown in Table 3, actual status has the most 
impact on aspired to status, but there is also an association between prestige- 
judgment dispersion and aspirations. For those with high status, prestige 
dispersion has a significant relationship with educational aspirations; and 
for those with low status, the association almost reaches a statistically 
significant level. The same trends can be seen in data relevant to the occupa­
tional aspirations of these respondents; however, we asked for those responses 
in an open-ended question, and almost one-third of the sample either failed 
to answer or gave such vague responses that they could not be coded.
־1 2־
Conclusions
It is clear that substantial and systematic differences exist in the 
perception of status as a function of the perceiver’s status in the system as 
it is objectively defined to be and as he sees it or anticipates it to be.
On either basis, the higher the status or the judge, the greater his judg­
mental dispersion, due largely to the fact that he judges lower status persons 
or positions as lower on the scale. This has been shown with occupational 
prestige judgments from a national sample in 1950 and an upper-middle class 
suburban sample of high school seniors in the late 1960s, as well as with the 
popularity judgments of members of a high school class. The same pattern has 
also been evident in earlier studies of community prestige. We are thus led 
to propose that it is a general characteristic of the perception of status 
(as placement along a consensually evaluative dimension) in any collectivity. 
The independent influence of self-perceived or aspired to status is an inter­
esting and important finding that has rarely been considered, and remains 
inadequately explored (Blau, 1957).
Differential status perceptions may prove important in such areas as 
the shaping of occupational and educational aspirations. Weinstein (1957-58) 
found that high status youngsters lumped everyone from skilled craftsmen to 
private household workers in the same low job category, while low status 
children classified skilled craftsmen with professionals in their top category. 
If objects are similarly classified, they are usually responded to in a 
similar manner. Thus, it may be that the skilled crafts seemed equivalent to 
domestic service in the eyes of upper status respondents, while lower status 
students might have regarded a skilled craftsman position as equivalent to a
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professional position in difficulty of attainment. Furthermore, if lower 
status persons systematically diminish the perceived prestige differences 
among all occupations, they may not be affected much by the "reward value" 
of prestige as an influence on occupational choices.
If there is a lawful relationship between prestige perceptions and 
aspirations, this would provide us with an easily manipulable way of changing 
aspirations. Most research on the determinants and antecedents of aspirations 
has focused on variables that are impossible or extremely difficult־ to manipu­
late— for example, familial factors, innate ability, underlying motivational 
and value structures, and so forth. It is decidedly frustrating to attend 
only to influential variables that cannot be controlled or modified; but the 
perceptual-pattern variable that has been emphasized here is cognitive and 
depends largely on the availability of information. Those who advise and 
counsel could readily manipulate the informational bases for prestige 
perceptions and, by that process, perhaps affect aspirations of students.
If this line of reasoning is systematically explored, we may find that 
people are responding to their perceptions of different status worlds rather 
than responding differently (for motivational reasons) to similar perceptions 
of consensually defined status structures. Apart from learning more about the 
cognitive impact of social structures on the persons who participate in them 
from different positions, further study will undoubtedly lead us to clarify 
and refine theoretical formulations that currently base their hypotheses on 
the assumption that status-objects have similarly defined values through the 
structure. Since this assumption of "consensual definition" pervades socio­
logical thought, the recognition of perspectivai differences by social position 
and the assessment of their effects should be a critical problem for the study 
of status-related social phenomena.
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PERCENT OF EXCELLENT-GOOD RATINGS OF "KNOWN" 
OCCUPATIONS BY STATUS OF JUDGE AND OCCUPATION JUDGED











MEAN POPULARITY JUDGMENTS— BY POPULARITY OF JUDGE AND JUDGED
Popularity of Judge Popularity of Judged_____  (N)
High Medium Low
High 6.7 4.7 3.0 (49)
Medium 6.7 4.9 3.3 (49)
Low 6.8 5.3 3.8 (49)
Table 3
MEAN SELF-PLACEMENT RATINGS— BY JUDGE’S POPULARITY AND 
STANDARD DEVIATION OF POPULARITY JUDGMENTS






MEAN OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE JUDGMENTS— AND PERCENT OF JUDGES ABOVE
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION— BY STATUS OF JUDGE AND OCCUPATIONS JUDGED
Status of Judged Occupations Per Cent Above Mean 




Differences by status level are significant beyond .05 level by 
chi square test with 1 d.f.
PER CENT WITH HIGH EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS— BY 
JUDGE'S STATUS AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PRESTIGE JUDGMENTS
Table 5
of Judge Standard Deviation of Chi Square Test
Prestige Judftments 
High Low
59.7%(258) 47.02(164) P I .01
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